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Abstract
Machine learning has automated much of financial fraud detection, notifying firms of – or even blocking – questionable transactions
instantly. However, data imbalance starves traditionally trained models of the content necessary to detect fraud. This study examines
three separate factors of credit card fraud detection via machine learning. First, it assesses the potential for different sampling
methods – undersampling and Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) – to improve algorithm performance in data-
starved environments. Additionally, five industry-practical machine learning algorithms are evaluated on total fraud cost savings in
addition to traditional statistical metrics. Finally, an ensemble of individual models is trained with a genetic algorithm to attempt
to generate higher cost efficiency than its components. Monte Carlo performance distributions discerned random undersampling
outperformed SMOTE in lowering fraud costs, and that an ensemble was unable to outperform its individual parts. Most notably,
the F1 Score, a traditional metric often used to measure performance with imbalanced data, was uncorrelated with derived cost
efficiency. Assuming a realistic cost structure can be derived, cost-based metrics provide an essential supplement to objective
statistical evaluation.
Keywords: Fraud, Linear SVC, Random Forest, Principal Component Analysis, Bayesian Theory, Logistic Regression, Monte
Carlo, Genetic Algorithm, Ensemble
1. Introduction
Since the birth of e-commerce in the early 1990s, Internet
purchasing and credit card fraud have proliferated across the
globe. Moreover, the host of challenges inherent in detecting
credit card fraud has made the field one of the most explored
[1]. Outlined in [2], individual purchasing behavior evolves
over time, as do the methods with which people commit fraud.
Credit card transactions are both high in volume and imbal-
anced [3], with few genuinely fraudulent transactions. High
volume also delays transaction feedback, prolonging the time
needed to adequately verify and categorize questionable activ-
ity [2].
Originally, manual oversight and client feedback were the
only defenses against fraud attacks. Today, however, a mul-
titude of rule-based and machine learning algorithms exist that
constantly scan for contentious credit card purchases [1, 4, 5, 6].
Despite these preventative measures, a 2016 LexisNexis survey
[7] of hundreds of corporations approximated fraud cost to be
billions annually. On average, businesses estimated their annual
cost of fraud to be 1.47% of total revenues. Furthermore, fraud
occurrence is substantially higher for online retailers [7], and
increased domination of mobile and e-pay options was the sin-
gle most cited concern companies had about preventing fraud.
Over 48% of online fraudulent transactions were made with a
credit card in 2016, far higher than debit card transactions [7]
and other methods.
Dozens endeavor to optimize the detection of fraud [8].
While credit card fraud is particularly well researched, it is
only one of many documented types spanning multiple indus-
tries. Even so, its impact is disproportionately large. Credit
card fraud can either take the form of application or behav-
ioral fraud. Application fraud is the act of procuring a credit
card using falsified or stolen information, and can be thought
of as a type of identity theft. Behavioral fraud, a much more
common occurrence, is the act of purchasing goods with stolen
credit card information. While this can occur at Point of Sale
(POS) locations, it is more commonly seen in Internet transac-
tions [7]. Many sources of information are leveraged to pre-
dict behavioral fraud, but profiling the purchasing activity of
individuals provides a functional benchmark from which future
transactions can be compared [9]. Temporal and location-based
information is also useful in this regard.
However, if purchasing behavior is sporadic or scant, profil-
ing is less useful. Consistently insightful transaction traits are
difficult to find, as is procuring data to test different Fraud De-
tection Systems (FDS). Credit card transactions are a form of
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), dictating many fea-
tures must be hashed or encoded. Additionally, banks and re-
tailers alike are extremely secretive about fraud [1] due to its
sensitive and unsavory nature. The lack of fraud transparency
in the public and private sectors is a consistent point of criti-
cism.
In spite of data scarcity, countless Fraud Detection Systems
have been created in the past decade. Generally, these are cat-
egorized as either supervised or unsupervised [4]. Supervised
machine learning models face a number of challenges, namely
an inability to identify new types of fraud as well as a perpet-
ual delay of data in what is known as veri f ication latency [2].
Questionable activity is often manually checked, and the result-
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ing delay is often ignored by fraud detection studies [2]. Con-
versely, unsupervised algorithms tend to cluster transactions
based on similarity. This enables a FDS to potentially catego-
rize new types of fraud, though human intervention is needed
to characterize each cluster [5]. In general, fraud detection has
not yet evolved enough to detect fraud independently. Rather,
anomaly detector may be a more adequate characterization of
these techniques.
Further complicating the matter, fraudulent activity exists as
a minute percentage of total credit card transactions, at times
less than 0.2% of available data. The predictive power of fraud
systems is heavily impacted by the composition of its train-
ing data. To combat classification bias, alternative methods
re-balance sample composition in favor of minority classifica-
tion. One of the most promising of these methods is under-
sampling, which randomly chooses a subsample of the major-
ity class, placing emphasis on the minority class. Conversely,
oversampling seeks to accomplish the same goal by sampling
with replacement from a minority class up to a certain thresh-
old [10].
Likewise, a novel sampling technique developed by [10]
incorporates facets of both undersampling and oversampling.
Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) can be
described as randomly undersampling the majority class as well
as generating synthetic minority records. While SMOTE’s tech-
nique is novel, Blagus et. al. [11] finds it does not outperform
undersampling when applied to gene expression data. Accord-
ing to their empirical results, synthetic records beyond a given
threshold confound the classification boundary between the ma-
jority and minority classes.
Lastly, an ongoing debate examines the ideal method of eval-
uating fraud detection algorithms. High data imbalance causes
accuracy and other traditional metrics to be misleading, as ig-
noring the minority class entirely could yield an accuracy well
over 99%. Many have posed alternative metrics [12], including
cost-based indicators and ranking systems.
2. Contribution
This paper has three objectives, all of which pertain
to optimizing fraud detection in data-starved environments.
The dataset implemented to test these theories is public,
anonymized, and has been transformed by Principal Compo-
nent Analysis [13]. Therefore, longitudinal data is absent and
temporal and location-based profiling techniques are not possi-
ble. Accordingly, this study compares the efficacy of undersam-
pling and SMOTE in training machine learning models. Since
standard sampling is ineffective with imbalanced data [14], it
is crucial to understand the predictive potential of alternative
methods.
Additionally, by tuning and testing a variety of commonly
used machine learning classifiers, this paper explores the corre-
lation between traditional performance metrics (Positive Pre-
dictive Value (PPV), True Positive Rate (T PR), F1 Score)
and cost efficiency. Though previously examined by [15] [16]
[17], economic cost evaluation is relatively unexplored despite
promising initial findings [18]. In the same vein, examining
fraud cost in situations with little data is particularly crucial as
new forms of fraud may not be documented. Our findings serve
as a contemporary exploration of previous research, but with a
greater focus on societal cost ease of industrial adoption.
Finally, genetic algorithms train an ensemble classifier com-
prised of independent algorithms. Preeminent models from pre-
vious experiments are combined and assigned weights. Itera-
tively, a genetic algorithm optimizes these weights within spec-
ified threshold bounds. Ultimately, this experiment discerns the
feasibility of improving fraud detection through a multi-model
voting system. Such a practice could prove useful when little
information can be gleaned from transaction history alone.
3. Procuring Publicly Available Credit Card Data
The paper utilizes a dataset comprised of 284,807 credit card
transactions occurring over two days. Published by unnamed
European bank in September 2013 [13], only 0.172% (492
records) of this data was fraudulent. As one of the few pub-
licly released fraud datasets, the features of these transactions
were anonymized (as V1,V2, ...Vn) and transformed using Prin-
cipal Component Analysis (PCA) [19] before being posted pub-
licly. PCA de-dimensionalizes data such that the only the most
distinguishable traits remain, implementing orthogonal trans-
formation to convert a set of observations with correlated vari-
ables into a linearly uncorrelated set. Only the amount and time
variables were not transformed.
As a result, connecting transactions to a specific user is im-
possible. Even if data was not anonymized, transaction history
over a two day window is likely unhelpful with profile based
classification. Therefore, the central focus of this paper is to
identify optimal sampling methods and model training practices
in the absence of situational context or historical data.
4. Sampling Methods
4.1. Simple Random Sampling
Traditionally, machine learning models are trained on a sim-
ple random sample of population data. Aside from preprocess-
ing, often all that is necessary to prepare data with popular ma-
chine learning software [20] is a test ratio, or the percentage of
data to be used for testing classifier performance. However, it
is commonly found that [10, 13, 14] simple random sampling
is unhelpful with problems of severe data imbalance. In turn,
alternative methods that artificially rebalance data are almost
exclusively used in industry and academia.
4.2. Undersampling
Liu et. al. [21] describes the process of undersampling as us-
ing a “subset of the majority class to train [a] classifier”. In this
manner, classifiers are more directly influenced by the charac-
teristics of the minority class. In practice, [22] confirms that un-
dersampling outperforms random oversampling, a method that,
instead of collecting a subset of the majority, generates a sam-
ple of minority records by selecting with replacement. Appli-
cations of oversampling tend to suffer from an ill-defined mi-
nority classification boundary. With-replacement samples of
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the minority class, regardless of size, often cannot generalize
trends beyond those present in training data [14]. However,
undersampling suffers from its own pitfalls. If the chosen sub-
set of majority class data is not prescriptive enough to identify
the majority population, the classifier will be unable to gener-
alize majority class identification. Even so, [21] finds that im-
plementing a bagging ensemble trained with different majority
subsets assuages the risks of information omission in training.
This innovation, coupled with ancillary techniques, have made
undersampling a staple of imbalanced data analysis.
4.3. SMOTE: Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique
A combination of undersampling and oversampling is known
as Synthetic Minority Oversampling. SMOTE endeavors to
compensate for undersampling’s weaknesses by allowing for
larger majority sample sizes while maintaining a specified ratio
of minority records. It is also thought to assist in generaliz-
ing a minority feature space with few records [10]. To do so,
a minority record is randomly chosen, as are its most similar k
“neighbors” using euclidean distance or an equivalent similar-
ity measure. A second minority record is then randomly chosen
from the k-neighbor subsample. Features X1−n for the synthetic
record are then derived as a linear combination of the original
record αi and its difference with selected neighbor αk, multi-
plied by a random scalar c chosen from a uniform distribution.
Xi = αi + c(αi − αk) i = 1, 2, ... n
c ∼ U(0, 1)
Chawla (2002) [10] provides evidence that supports the va-
lidity of SMOTE’s aforementioned merits. Asserting that syn-
thetically generating records prevents “overfitting on the mul-
tiple copies of minority class examples”, Chawla (2002) main-
tains SMOTE causes the “decision region of the minority class
to become more general.” At the same time, increasing the num-
ber of minority records through synthetic creation allows for a
greater number of majority records to be included in the train-
ing data while maintaining the desired minority-majority ratio.
Ramezankhani et. al. (2016) [23] also found boosted perfor-
mance with SMOTE in lipid and glucose experimentation.
5. Calculating Model Performance with Data Imbalance
As traditional sampling techniques falter with imbalanced
optimization problems [11], so do traditional evaluation strate-
gies. Other than accuracy measures, a common practice
in binary classification problems is to define performance in
terms of true positive, f alse positive, true negative, and
f alse negative rates. As seen in the con f usion matrix be-
low, true positives and true negatives are correctly classified
fraudulent and non-fraudulent records, respectively. By con-
trast, a false negative occurs when fraud goes undetected and a
false positive characterizes a false alarm, when a transaction is
flagged but not fraudulent. Segmenting classifier performance
into these four groups affords researchers the freedom to weight
different outcomes independently [2].
Prediction
Actual Transaction
Fraud
True
Positive
(TP)
False
Positive
(FP)
Not Fraud
False
Negative
(FN)
True
Negative
(TN)
Fraud Not Fraud
Table 1: Confusion matrix for credit card fraud detection
Subsequently, many assessment metrics are derived from ta-
ble 1. Listed in equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the eight basic indi-
cators derived from confusion matrices: true and false positive
and negative rates (T PR, FPR, T NR, FNR), positive and nega-
tive predictive value (PPV , NPV), false discovery rate (FDR),
and false omission rate (FOR). Visually, all equations in the
left column focus on successful classification, while the right
column focuses on failure rates.
T PR =
T P
T P + FN
FPR =
FP
FP + T N
(1)
T NR =
T N
T N + FP
FNR =
FN
FN + T P
(2)
PPV =
T P
T P + FP
FDR =
FP
T P + FP
(3)
NPV =
T N
T N + FN
FOR =
FN
T N + FN
(4)
Conceptually, TPR and TNR determine how many fraud
records were appropriately classified. Both of these metrics
are direct evaluations of model performance by class, and ask
the question: how many fraud records were classified cor-
rectly? Conversely, PPV and NPV can be described as a
prediction centric evaluation of the confusion matrix, condi-
tionally examining results given a specific prediction. That is,
for all records predicted to be fraudulent, how many actually
were?
One way these indicators can discern classifier performance
is with the Area Under the Reciever Operating Characteristic
(AUROC) [24]. Implemented to increase emphasis on detect-
ing the minority class, AUROC maps an algorithm’s T PR and
FPR classification ability at different thresholds. However, as
noted in [25], some confusion matrix measures are biased for
imbalanced datasets due to a disproportionally large number of
true negative records. False Positive Rates (FPR) are held arti-
ficially low by this imbalance, over-estimating fraud detection
efficacy.
To garner a more realistic picture of performance in an im-
balanced setting, researchers derived the Area Under the Pre-
cision Recall (AUPRC) curve. Subtly distinct from AUROC,
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AUPRC maps T PR and PPV , also known as recall and preci-
sion. AUPRC is thought to assuage issues of FPR bias by con-
sidering the success rate of minority classification rather than
its failure rate, correcting biases caused by the majority class.
Indeed, Davis & Goadrich (2006) [26] assert that a ”curve dom-
inates in ROC space if and only if it dominates in PR space.”
That is, AUPRC measurements embody a more robust method
of testing for algorithmic optimality.
Nevertheless, some still take issue with AUPRC as the defini-
tive performance indicator as the ultimate pursuit of fraud de-
tection is to minimize the cost to society [16]. As noted by [7],
this cost takes different forms. Implications beyond the de-facto
cost of the fraudulent transaction include the time-loss on be-
half of the bank or retailer in identifying the issue, loss of trust
(and potentially business) of clients and customers, and loss of
productivity on behalf of the victim who may need to apply
for a new card. The fraud multiplier of $2.40 [7] only covers
cost incurred by the company, excluding cost to the individual
victim or tertiary party involved. Thus, [15], [18], and others
propose a derived cost function.
Prediction
Cost
Actual Transaction Cost
Fraud −Tc + C f Ce
Not Fraud
Fm(Tc) +
Cl
0
Fraud Not Fraud
Table 2: Cost matrix for evaluating credit card fraud detection algorithms.
Cost matrices allow the user to dynamically weight the im-
portance of different outcomes. Table 2 represents a unique cost
matrix similar to those proposed by [15] and [18]. Identifying
and preventing a fraudulent transaction equates to saving the
cost of the transaction −Tc as well as the time cost C f of re-
solving the event. Similarly, false alarms (FP) cost the amount
of time needed to correct the error, Ce. Most importantly, fail-
ing to detect fraud increases the cost of the transaction by the
fraud multiplier Fm, plus the cost of addressing the loss, Cl.
The sensibility of cost-based evaluation has been questioned
since its inception despite its practicality [15]. Simply put by
[27], “the cost of a fraud is not easy to define.” Indeed, contem-
porary Fraud Detection Systems have multiple layers. Rule-
based credential authorization offers a first layer of defense,
followed by algorithmic classification and terminating at hu-
man oversight. Derivation of company-specific cost models
is hampered by this complexity. Additionally, [2] asserts that
cost-based metrics ignore the disruptive nature of fraud alerts
and company costs. However, such an argument also applies to
many traditional metrics, including AUPRC. Debate continues
and traditional metrics are still implemented as performance in-
dicators [1].
6. Evolution of Fraud Detection Systems
In the past two decades, roughly a dozen articles summarize
hundreds of experiments conducted on different types of fraud.
Many of these dedicate large portions of their articles to credit
card fraud [9, 4, 8, 1]. Of note, [8] identify outlier detection
via supervised learning to be the most common, though it is
implemented in many different forms.
In particular, neural networks are included in a plurality of
Fraud Detection Systems. In fact, neural network applications
have been utilized since the proliferation of e-commerce. Com-
pensating for data imbalance with Fisher’s linear discriminant
analysis, [28] created a neural network classifier that stood as
a cornerstone achievement alongside CARDWATCH [6]. To-
day, some networks make use of unsupervised clustering mod-
els to identify unprecedented fraud methods. Even with this
advantage, veri f ication latency stands as a major drawback for
all supervised models, particularly neural networks that require
significant time to train.
The additional challenge of concept drift and verification la-
tency, along with the increasing cost of fraud, have led to the
creation of innovative new techniques spanning multiple disci-
plines. Graph-based anomaly detection and inductive logic are
only a few new implementations [1]. Multi-faceted ranking,
searching, and scoring ensemble methods have also spread in
the past decade [27], often coupled with cost-based evaluation
and Genetic Algorithms [29].
Unfortunately, systems derived in academia do not consis-
tently transfer to a corporate setting. While contemporary mod-
els continue to increase in complexity, Phua et. al. (2010) [1]
laments that many fraud-plagued industries are ”dependent on
the practical issues of operational requirements, resource con-
straints, and management commitment towards reduction of
fraud.” Such constraints are rarely, if ever, imposed on mod-
els in a research setting. Despite the fact that experiments on
computationally efficient algorithms [30] are continually con-
ducted and published, their industrial practicality is seldom em-
phasized. In turn, the following experiment will only make use
of relatively lightweight, scalable classification methods.
7. Research Methods
7.1. Automating Fraud Detection Experiments
To examine a variety of samples and models, as well as train
an ensemble with genetic algorithm (GA) optimization, a mod-
ular testing platform was created. Encapsulated in Test objects,
a specified sample and model are run repeatedly via Monte
Carlo simulations, as shown in Figure 1. Results are stored
after each testing cycle in a Logger object as a result log before
the sample is re-created and the process repeats. If an ensemble
is specified, performance will be stored in the same location. At
the end of the execution, a master log of all execution parame-
ters, average results, and meta-data is sent to the Logger.
Sampling: All executions begin with a command sent to
the sampling engine that randomly selects 20% of the entire
dataset to be used for sample creation. The remaining records
are set aside for testing. Fed approximately 100 and 59,900
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Figure 1: Scalable automation platform for testing fraud detection algorithms
fraud and non-fraud records, respectively, the sample engine
then launches an orchestration package dependent on sample
method, sample size, and fraud ratio parameters. Undersamp-
ing samples ignore the desired sample size, as its maximum size
is constrained by the desired ratio of fraud records. Conversely,
SMOTE samples includes all fraudulent records, and then syn-
thetically adds to the minority subsample until the specified
fraud threshold is reached. Any records not used in the final
sample are added to the testing dataset. Due to PCA transfor-
mations of the source data, no preprocessing is considered aside
from sample generation.
Modeling: Provided a training sample, the machine learn-
ing modeler enters a Monte Carlo loop with a specified num-
ber of iterations. Implemented with Sci-kit Learn, the modeler
tests Logistic Regression, Linear Support Vector, Random For-
est, K-Nearest Neighbors, and Gaussian Naive Baye’s classi-
fiers. KNN serves as the control due to its notoriously poor
performance with imbalanced datasets [31]. Each model is
trained and tested on the same sample, with performance met-
rics logged ad-hoc. After the execution terminates, the modeler
re-instantiates the sample object, which re-partitions the entire
dataset and creates a new sample. Once the Monte Carlo loop
completes, performance records for each model are averaged
and stored in the master log.
Ensemble: If little information can be gleaned from a
dataset, then coordinating multiple predictions may yield a bet-
ter result. Just as a governing body operates on popular vote,
so too does the fraud detection ensemble. By assigning weights
to different fraud predictors and then optimizing them with ge-
netic algorithms, ensemble performance may exceed that of its
components.
To test this theory, the modeler engine is provided an en-
semble evolution object. If desired, this object is instantiated
and called as a part of the Monte-Carlo cycle. Feedback during
evolution is provided by partitioning the original sample into a
training and testing subsets. All individual models are trained
with the training subsample, and their individual predictions are
recorded.
These individual predictions are then assigned random
weights, and genetic evolution commences. A random popula-
tion of weights is generated, and those with the highest fitness
(lowest cost) receive a increased probability of being chosen to
populate the following generation. New generations of weights
inherit traits from their parents through bit string crossover. Fit-
ness is then calculated for the new offspring, and the process
continues until the execution times out. After evolution ter-
minates, individual models generate predictions for the testing
sample. Optimized weights are applied to these transactions,
giving a weighted average probability of fraud.
7.2. Cost-Based and Statistical Evaluation Practices
During executions, T P, FN, T N, and FP rates are stored
for each model, from which many additional metrics (T PR,
FNR, PPV , NPV) are derived. Furthermore, general Precision
and Recall metrics shown in equation 5 provide holistic mea-
sure of proficiency by class (Recall) as well as by prediction
(Precision). These are composite competency metrics, not to
be confused with PPV and T PR, sometimes referred to as pre-
cision and recall. Contextually, Precision here is defined as the
mean prediction precision: what percentage of each prediction
type were correct? Similarly, Recall discerns the mean percent-
age of each class that were categorized correctly.
Precision =
PPV + NPV
2
Recall =
T PR + T NR
2
(5)
Likewise, the F1 Score (also known as the F − Measure) en-
capsulates the holistic predictive power of an algorithm with a
focus on the minority class. Contemporary researchers includ-
ing [13] regard the F1 Score to be a suitable measure of pre-
dictability, even with imbalanced datasets. Much like AUPRC,
the F1 Score combines PPV and T PR to avoid bias introduced
by disproportionately large T N counts.
F1 = 2
( PPV ∗ T PR
PPV + T PR
)
=
2T P
2T P + FP + FN
(6)
Lastly, cost scores are generated using the framework out-
lined in Table 2. Since no company data is available for deriv-
ing explicit cost metrics, the cost of correct fraud detection C f
is set at $10, while fraud error correction is set at Ce. The cost
of not discovering fraud Cl is also set at $10. The fraud mul-
tiplier is set at $2.40, cited from the 2016 LexisNexis Survey.
The total cost of fraud Fc for this study can be calculated as
Fc = (T P + FN)C f l + (FP)Ce +
n∑
i=1
Fm(Tic|Ti=FN) − (Tic|Ti=TP)
where C f l = Cl = C f , T P is the sum of true positives, FP is the
total of false positives, and Ti represents the ith transaction in a
testing set of size n. These variables are not based on empirical
data in this study, and addressing a false positive is assumed to
be less costly compared to addressing a genuinely fraudulent
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transaction. More importantly, this study is merely outlining a
process by which companies could improve classification scor-
ing. We recommend tailoring cost matrices to meet specific
business needs.
7.3. Implementing Practically Feasible Classifiers
Acknowledging the challenges cited in [1] of applying aca-
demic models to industry, we selected classifiers based on a
combination of implementation practicality and past success
detecting fraud. Higher-order profiling is impossible in this
dataset, and its size inhibits the presence of concept drift.
Therefore, these models strike a balance between time and spa-
tial complexity as well as predictive accuracy.
Logistic Regression (LOG): One of the most commonly im-
plemented binary classification analyses [32], Logistic Regres-
sion is a discriminant Bayesian model that approaches binary
classification through direct calculation of Bayesian posterior
P(y|x) of the joint probability distribution P(x, y) [33]. Logis-
tic regressions assume little correlation (if any) exists between
predictors in the feature space, as well as that few outliers and
minimal skew are present. While characteristics of the provided
data are not available in raw form, it can be assumed that PCA
transformation approximately satisfies these requirements [19].
Prevailing research also finds discriminative calculation – even
without computational or data quality considerations – to be
generally preferred [33]. The empirical findings of this model
will be compared with Gaussian Naive Bayes predictors to test
this hypothesis.
Linear Support Vector Classifier (SVC): Vapnik (1995)
[34] first proposed Support Vector Machines (SVM) for pattern
recognition by categorizing the problem as fitting an optimal
separating hyperplane in Rn feature space, where n is the num-
ber of features. By treating observations as support vectors,
Vapnik characterizes the classifier as a Lagrangian optimization
of the form:
y(x) = sign
[ N∑
i=1
αkykΨ(x, xk) + b
]
(7)
“for a training set of N data points {yk, xk}Nk=1 where xk ∈ Rn is
the kth input pattern and yk ∈ R is the kth output pattern.” [35].
αk are positive, real constants, as is b. Notably, SVM makes use
of kernel function Ψ, which transforms data to be optimal for
hyperplane separation. Since Vapnik discovered Support Vec-
tor Machine’s efficacy at pattern recognition, variant classifiers
have become common due to the flexibility afforded by ker-
nel functions. For example, Suykens (1999) [35] determined a
popular method for implementing SVM with least squares opti-
mization. Kernel research continues to derive new applications
for different disciplines.
However, traditional Support Vector Machines are computa-
tionally expensive, even for Linear SVMs that utilize a kernel
of the form Ψ(x, xk) = xtk x. To assuage resource constraints for
classifying large datasets, [36] developed a method for optimiz-
ing Linear Support Vector Classifiers without a kernel function.
Instead, L1 and L2 regularization functions were employed.
L1 = argminw
n∑
i=1
[
yi −
m∑
j=0
w jxi j
]2
+ λ
m∑
j=0
|w j| (8)
L2 = argminw
n∑
i=1
[
yi −
m∑
j=0
w jxi j
]2
+ λ
m∑
j=0
w2j (9)
In machine learning, L1 loss is also known as Least Absolute
Deviations (LAD) and included as part of regularization func-
tions that classifiers seek to minimize. L2 is similar to L1 loss
with the exception that it seeks to minimize the Least Squares
Error (LSE). Both of these regularization functions are catego-
rized for weights w, output label y, and prediction x in equations
8 and 9. C, another parameter tuned for Logistic Regression and
Linear SVC, is a term for inverse regularization strength
(
1
λ
)
.
This characterizes how harshly a model’s complexity should be
penalized during training.
Random Forests (RF): Breiman (2001) [37] defines Ran-
dom Forests as “a combination of tree predictors such that each
tree depends on the values of a random vector.” An ensemble al-
gorithm, Random Forest classifiers derive their efficiency from
a sufficiently large number of decision trees. Each decision tree
in a group may suffer from high generalization error and over-
fitting. But, if taken together as a random forest voting system,
the ensemble has been proven to produce a ”limiting ... gener-
alization error” [37].
When applied as a fraud detection algorithm, Random
Forests have also been deemed empirically robust against the
challenges of data imbalance [30]. Moreover, Random Forest
classification of credit card fraud was found by [38] to be a suf-
ficient means of classification, even with incomplete or imbal-
anced data. Random Forest’s ensemble may be stochastically
robust against the lack of information present in data employed
by this study.
Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB): As opposed to the discrimi-
nant Bayesian implementation employed by Logistic Regres-
sion [33], Gaussian Naive Bayes classification generates the
joint probability distribution P(x, y) through learning and then
uses Bayes Theorem to calculate P(y|x). Favored for its simple
and efficienct implementation, Bayesian models consistently
perform well across a variety of applications [4]. The high
transaction volume for credit cards favors Bayesian models for
their fast prediction generation [1], and many variant techniques
like Bayes Minimum Risk (BMR) and Bayesian Neural Net-
works [39] have found success in credit card fraud [25]. Out-
lined by [40], Gaussian Naive Bayesian models assume features
are independent and model a normal distribution.
f (x | µ, σ) = 1√
2piσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (10)
By using an empirically discovered µ and σ for each feature,
a Gaussian probability distribution can be derived, as shown in
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equation 10. This information is then be fed into record classi-
fication in equation 11, where P(A|B) is equal to the product of
the probabilities of each feature Bi belonging to the normal dis-
tribution of that feature N(µBi , σBi ) derived from training data.
P(A|B) = P(A)
n∏
i=1
P(Bi|A) (11)
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): The control classifier, K-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) is a rudimentary machine learning
classifier. Though highly dependent on the dataset and appli-
cation, KNN can be an effective means of prediction. A test
prediction is generated by finding the K most similar records in
the training data, and returning the most common class label in
the set. Similarity d of a training record x relative to test record
y is often determined using Euclidean distance (12) function
defined for a dataset with n features as
d(x) =
n∑
i=1
√
(xi − yi)2 (12)
where xi is the ithfeature of the training record. KNN has
been shown to be an effective algorithm for some classifica-
tion problems, but it is commonly known [38] to struggle with
imbalanced data. Traditionally, an increase in the number of
neighbors would correspond to a more general consideration of
class characteristics and a better prediction. Imbalanced data
prevents this improvement. As the number of neighbors in-
creases, minority class representation in the K-subsample de-
creases, reducing algorithm performance.
Ensemble Classification and Genetic Algorithms Ensem-
ble methods have found significant success across many fields
of applied machine learning [30]. The ensemble implemented
in this study takes the highest performing individual classifiers
and weights them to produce a classification in the form of a
weighted average. Ensemble studies in outlier detection and
other disciplines [41] have determined genetic algorithms to be
a suitable method for finding optimal parameters in high dimen-
sional feature space.
The algorithm begins with an array of random weights, one
for each algorithm. These weights are chosen from the uniform
distribution U ∼ [1, 240) so integer weights are defined by 40
bits or fewer. This allows the genetic algorithm to treat the bi-
nary representation of these numbers as ”genes” and vary them
throughout the evolution process. For each generation, 50 ar-
rays are generated, each with a probability of succession P(s)
determined by its fitness f . To determine this probability, fit-
ness measurements (fraud costs) are first converted to positive
values fp by the transformation in equation 13
fpi = fi + fmin + 1 (13)
where fpi is the positive fitness of the ith weight array and fmin
is the lowest fitness in the generation. It is important to note
that since cost is used as a fitness metric, low fitness scores are
desired. Therefore, fp values are inverted before probabilities
are taken. This calculation takes the form of equation 14
P(x) =
fpmax + 1 − fpi∑n
i=1 ( fpmax + 1 − fpi )
(14)
where fpmax is the maximum (worst) fitness score. In turn, all
of the weights in the array sum to one. With these probability
scores, the following generations are populated by repeatedly
choosing two weight arrays from the existing population and
generating a child array with bit-manipulation crossover. Bit
flipping is also used to randomly mutate arrays in a population,
though this is set to occur rarely. To prevent the ensemble from
over-weighting an individual model, a ceiling weight wmax is
set at 0.49. Each ensemble optimization via genetic algorithm
is given a specific runtime of 1 minute.
8. Empirical Findings
8.1. Undersampling generates superior model performance
relative to SMOTE
Sample size and fraud ratio combinations are listed in Ta-
ble 3, with the best sample parameters for each method noted
as well. Since undersampling did not depend on a set sample
size, we were able to computationally search the entire sample-
model feature space. That is, for each fraud ratio derived un-
dersample, every model was tuned and tested for all parameter
combinations listed in Table 4.
Table 3: Tested Sampling Combinations
Sample Sample Fraud Best Sample
Method Size (Thous.) Ratio (size, ratio)
SMOTE 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 0.1, 0.2, ... 0.5 (1, 0.5)
Under - 0.1, 0.2, ... 0.5 ( - , 0.3)
By contrast, SMOTE’s dependency on both a specific sam-
ple size and fraud ratio made it computationally infeasible to
search the entire model-sample feature space outlined in Ta-
ble 4. Therefore, a bootstrapping method was implemented to
indirectly converge on the optimal sample size and fraud ra-
tio. First, all samples were tested with default parameters as-
signed to each model. Default parameters are provided by Sci-
kit Learn, and are listed in Table 5. After testing all SMOTE
sample sizes and fraud ratio combinations, the sample with the
lowest average cost across all models is discerned and used to
test all parameters. With sampling parameters held constant,
optimal parameters are identified independently for each algo-
rithm.
Classifier parameters are then fed back in to the model and
held constant as sample-ratio combinations are tested again.
This process continues until empirical results converge on a sin-
gle sample-ratio combination. Random model parameters and
sample-ratio combinations were also tested to independently
verify a local optimum. If independent findings were incon-
sistent with the current results, bootstrapping continued using
the random parameters aforementioned. All iterations ran 100
Monte Carlo simulations for every unique sample-ratio-model
combination.
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Figure 2: Comparison of SMOTE and Undersampling methods as they pertain
to training RF, SVC, LOG classifiers to minimize fraud cost. All figures are
cumulative frequency histograms. Fraud cost given in USD - Thousands.
Table 4: Model Tuning Tested Parameters
Parameters
Model Penalty C Trees (RF)
Name or K (KNN)
LOG l1, l2 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 20
SVC l1, l2 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 20
RF 10, 20 ... 100
KNN 10, 20 ... 100
While searching for the ideal SMOTE sample, models with
outlier performance were detected and dropped. For a classifier
to be dropped from the remainder of the study, its fraud cost
had to be significantly higher than the average of all models in
both undersampling and SMOTE samples.
As noted in Tables 5 and 6, the fraud cost of the K-Nearest
Neighbors algorithm was orders of magnitude higher than other
models, regardless of parameter tuning. Therefore, its perfor-
mance was not considered during the bootstrapping process.
Gaussian Naive Bayes, though lower in cost than KNN, was
also dropped for the same reason (see Figure 3). Additionally,
Logistic Regression and Linear SVC Classifiers optimized with
L2 regularization functions were dropped as the difference in
performance between L1 and L2 regularized functions was sig-
nificantly large (see Figures 6 and 7).
In general, a SMOTE samples fraud ratio was the most in-
dicative of its ability to train highly efficient, low cost algo-
rithms. Though fraud costs varied by iteration, most algorithms
experienced improved performance as the fraud ratio increased
up to 50%. After a threshold of 30%, fraud cost differences in
many models were not significant enough to be distinguished
from variance in performance. In the same vein, many models
(Table 6) depicted a slight positive relationship between rising
cost and rising sample size.
Undersampling did not possess a consistent trend between
fraud ratio and model performance. Gaussian Naive Bayes and
Random Forest Classifiers continuously improved as the fraud
ratio increased. Conversely, regression-based models Linear
SVC and Logistic classification possessed a quadratic relation-
ship with a fraud ratio that peaked at 30%, decreasing thereafter.
Logistic Regression and Linear SVC also had higher average
performance for a fraud ratio of 0.2, but this was overshadowed
by Random Forest’s increase in performance as it moved from
a fraud ratio of 0.2 to 0.3. Repeatedly sampling verifies all of
these trends with relative certainty despite the stochastic nature
of sampling methods used in this analysis. Thus, the optimal
fraud ratio was set a 0.3 to embody the best average perfor-
mance for the three best classifiers. Using the best holistic sam-
ple, model parameters were tuned to minimize the cost of fraud.
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Figure 3: Mean performance of all FDSs, all parameters. The y-axis represents fraud cost in USD - Thousands, and black lines signify sample σ.
8.2. Optimal model parameters consistent across sample types
Optimal size and fraud ratios for SMOTE and undersampling
were held constant as different parameters for Fraud Detection
Systems were tested. With the exception of Random Forest
Classifiers, no algorithm proved to be robust across all of its
parameter combinations.
Table 5: Parameter Legend
SMOTE Under
Model Default Best. Best.
(Params.) Param. Param. Param.
LOG
(Pen. C) l2, 1 l1, 0.5 l1, 0.5
SVC
(Pen. C) l2, 1 l1, 0.5 l1, 0.5
RF
(# Trees) 10 80 80
KNN
(K) 5 10 10
K-Nearest Neighbors achieved its highest predictive power
with a K of 10. Further increases in the number of neighbors
gradually decreased the F1 Score and increased the fraud cost
of the algorithm. While the root cause of this trend is unknown,
it is possible that the minority-majority class boundary in the
training data is not well defined. KNN’s predictive accuracy
is dependent on a well-defined boundary between majority and
minority data. Credit card fraud detection can be categorized
as an outlier detection problem, and therefore may not have
enough minority class information to generalize a boundary in
the training data. Concept drift exacerbates this issue, poten-
tially causing minority records in training data to not be repre-
sentative of the testing sample. Thus, KNN was dropped as a
suitable fraud detection system.
Gaussian Naive Bayes does not have parameters with which
it may be tuned. Consistently, the fraud cost of GNB decreases
as the fraud ratio of the sample data increases. Even so, data
outlined in Table 6 denotes GNB was unable to consistently
generate an average fraud cost below $0 for undersamples.
With no additional tuning possible, the GNB Fraud System is
impossible to improve. Therefore, it was also dropped from the
analysis.
Random Forest classifiers performed best in situations where
the minority class was represented most in sample. Cost sav-
ings for these Fraud Detection Systems was the lowest for
samples with a fraud ratio of 50% across both undersampling
and SMOTE. Also, models optimized best with the small-
est SMOTE samples with 1000 records, holding fraud ratios
constant. Perhaps decision trees built primarily on synthetic
records are over-fitting to the training dataset and unable to
generalize rules for identifying fraud. Synthetic records do not
greatly deviate from the originals from which they were derived
and may not allow classification boundaries to generalize.
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Table 6: Under Sample Tuning Summary: Best Parameters
Model Performance
Fraud LOG LOG SVC SVC RF RF GNB GNB KNN KNN
Ratio F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($)
0.1 33.50 −4992 36.95 −4392 53.80 −3898 17.08 21,513 2.01 116,711
0.2 18.28 −9134 17.05 −8916 32.24 −5214 15.78 17,897 1.28 111,311
0.3 11.60 −12,318 9.77 −10,744 19.43 −6365 14.41 14,082 0.87 113,065
0.4 7.62 −11,011 6.00 −9520 12.49 −7969 13.56 12,159 0.61 121,524
0.5 4.94 −8888 3.95 −5942 8.93 −8894 12.37 9508 0.46 135,647
Table 7: SMOTE Sample Tuning Summary: Best Parameters
Model Performance
Sample Fraud LOG LOG SVC SVC RF RF
Size Ratio F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($) F1 (%) Cost ($)
1,000 0.2 21.40 −8416 21.59 −6931 40.94 −4738
0.3 15.88 −9286 15.43 −9289 29.58 −4663
0.4 11.80 −10,685 11.78 −9499 25.05 −7329
0.5 8.49 −10,012 8.22 −9681 18.76 −8290
2,000 0.1 38.82 −5571 44.05 −4587 50.80 −4024
0.2 23.65 −8671 25.19 −6925 44.39 −5898
0.3 18.83 −7854 20.09 −7249 38.30 −5492
0.4 12.57 −7979 12.94 −7471 32.56 −5706
0.5 9.32 −9331 9.61 −9157 26.83 −7708
3,000 0.1 39.65 −4672 46.36 −3463 52.71 −4410
0.2 25.48 −6647 26.97 −5555 49.19 −4894
0.3 18.88 −8997 20.10 −7866 42.20 −5726
0.4 15.12 −8690 15.68 −7935 39.49 −5036
0.5 10.59 −8499 10.77 −7333 32.85 −6091
5,000 0.1 43.43 −3039 51.36 −2358 56.17 −4218
0.2 27.79 −6011 29.79 −4831 52.83 −3749
0.3 20.09 −6956 21.71 −6391 50.00 −4366
0.4 15.05 −7907 15.91 −7233 46.10 −4805
0.5 11.26 −8008 11.71 −7098 42.54 −4671
10,000 0.1 43.25 −4299 51.76 −3172 58.21 −4225
0.2 28.53 −7590 31.20 −6424 56.17 −5368
0.3 21.56 −7575 23.30 −7080 55.15 −4191
0.4 16.22 −8727 17.25 −8035 52.81 −4147
0.5 12.97 −9276 13.43 −8236 50.71 −4740
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Regardless, Random Forest Classifiers trained on both sam-
ples performed optimally with the maximum of 100 decision
trees. Larger tree counts may have performed even better, but
experimentation was practically limited by sample size con-
straints. An undersample with a 50% fraud ratio may only con-
tain 160 records.
Outlined in Figure 4, Random Forest detection of fraud is
particularly robust. Average fraud cost starkly shifts as mod-
els went from 10 to 20 trees, as did fraud cost variation. Cost
continued to drop as more trees were added, but only slightly
compared to initial improvements. Near 90 and 100 neighbors,
changes in mean performance are too minute to differentiate
from sample variation. However, it appears that the distribution
skews left as more trees are added. As expected, Random For-
est classification was one of the most robust models to concept
drift, data imbalance, and even its own meta-parameters.
Logistic Regression was the most efficient model at mini-
mizing the cost of fraud. Each classifier tested was tuned by
two parameters: a regularization function (penalty) and the
strength term C. A scalar coefficient that calibrates regular-
ization strength (see Table 4), fraud detection models worked
best with a low C value, or a high penalty λ for regulariza-
tion. Contextually, a high λ value may be necessary to create
a functional FDS. Little fraud data is available, leading many
alternative samples to be small. Low regularization penalties
may quickly lead to over-fitting and generalization error.
Cost-based performance with Linear SVC algorithms also
improves as regularization strength λ increases. Fraud cost
trends witnessed during model tuning for Logistic Regression
are directly paralleled by Linear SVC. As noted in the next sec-
tion, both were heavily influenced by different regularization
functions.
8.3. Regularization central to LOG and SVC performance
Articulated by equations 8 and 9, two regularization func-
tions were utilized to fit both Logistic and Linear SVC classi-
fiers to fraud data. While implementations are similar, resulting
fraud costs for each type were quite different. These differences
are visualized with the illustrations in Figure 6 and 7 for Linear
SVC and Logistic Regression, respectively.
Mapped on a feature space of F1 performance and fraud cost,
a performance distribution. The darkness of each section cor-
relates to the density of observations found therein. Also note
that each subplot in Figures 6 and 7 has a unique y − range,
though all share the same x − axis. The purpose of this is to
compare the F1 scores while simultaneously underscoring the
stark differences in fraud cost between L1 and L2 optimized
Fraud Detection Systems.
Figures 3 and 5 for articulate the stark impact regularization
had on performance for Linear SVC classification. Across all
regularization strength parameters, Linear SVC classifiers op-
timized with Least Square Error regularization had an average
fraud cost of $169,694 compared to a cost of -$5196 for Least
Absolute Deviation, a difference of $174,890 over two days.
Annually, the difference in cost savings for these classifiers
would amount to millions, highlighting the central importance
of model tuning.
Figure 4: Fraud cost of RF classification using different numbers of decision
trees (y − axis) in ensemble. Fraud cost represented in USD - Thousands.
Figure 5: Model performance without outliers. LOG and SVC models trained
with L2 regularization have been dropped. The y-axis represents fraud cost in
USD - Thousands, and black lines signify sample σ.
Figure 6 provides further detail on Linear SVC cost discrep-
ancies. The consistency of performance for L1 models is de-
picted by the unimodal distribution around a cost of -$10,000
and a F1 Score of 0.1. Conversely, the same models tuned
with L2 loss possess a polymodal distribution centered on an F1
Score of approximately 0.03. The L2 trained performance dis-
tribution appears to achieve costs in excess of $200,000 fairly
consistently.
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Figure 6: Linear SVC comparison of L1 (LAD) and L2 (LS E) regularization
functions. The y − axis represents fraud cost in USD - thousands.
Logistic regression maintains the same cost differences be-
tween regularization practices, though the effect is far less pro-
nounced. On average, the performance of L2 models across all
C parameters is approximately equal to $2521. Though a re-
spectable fraud cost, L1 trained algorithms generate an average
cost of $6988 under the same circumstances. Additionally, Fig-
ure 7 describes the differences in performance distributions for
Logistic Regression on both traditional and cost-based metrics.
Figure 7: Logistic Regression comparison of L1 (LAD) and L2 (LS E) regular-
ization functions. The y − axis represents fraud cost in USD - thousands.
Again, performance distribution for L2 trained models is
much less concentrated for Logistic Regression. Trending in
the plot seems to indicate a slight positive relationship between
F1 Score and higher cost. This positive correlation contradicts
the notion that a higher F1 Score should correspond to lower
cost. Visually, the SVC performance distribution appears nearly
identical to that of Logistic Regression when trained with L1
regularization, implying L1 is effective for imbalanced data.
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Figure 8: Ensemble performance relative to its components based on F1 score
and fraud cost. All models have identical axes, and the y−axis represents fraud
cost in USD - thousands.
8.4. Ensemble unable to outperform individual components.
The top three performing models by fraud cost: Random For-
est, Linear SVC, and Logistic Regression, were chosen as the
components of the ensemble. Due to the stochastic nature of
genetic algorithms, ensemble performance, and random sam-
pling, Monte Carlo tests for ensemble efficacy were run 1000
times. For the majority of these iterations, at least one weight
converged to the ceiling threshold of 49%.
Undersampling was yielded the most cost-effective Fraud
Detection Systems, and therefore it was used to test ensem-
ble performance. Undersamples with a fraud ratio of 0.3 were
taken an then split into 60% and 40% training and testing sets,
respectively. Optimal model parameters (Table 5) were also
utilized. Interestingly, these subsets were roughly comprised of
100 records each, an incredibly small percentage of the sam-
pling population. Yet, as depicted by Figure 8, all algorithms
were able to achieve costs far lower than those built with larger
samples.
In particular, Random Forest proved to be the most consistent
model regarding fraud cost, but the most variable regarding F1
scores as denoted by the width of its distribution plot. Logistic
and Linear SVC classifiers were far more variable in their cost
output despite consistent F1 scores. Ensemble performance in
the bottom plot embodies both of these distributions, but was
unable to attain a lower average cost performance that its com-
ponents.
With an average fraud cost of -$10,847, the ensemble algo-
rithm outperformed all other models except Logistic Regres-
sion, which had an mean cost of -$11,168. Yet, it had a lower
cost variance than Logistic Regression and Linear SVC, as seen
in Figure 9. Though sub-optimal when considered solely for its
cost saving potential, ensemble consistency may be particularly
valuable if high variation is present in existing transaction ac-
tivity. Striking a balance between performance and variation is
central to long-term fraud detection success.
Figure 9: Box plot of ensemble and component fraud cost (USD - thousands)
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Table 8: Ensemble Performance Relative to Components
Fraud Counts Model Performance
Model TP FN TN FP T PR T NR PPV NPV Rec. Prec. Acc. F1 Cost
(Param.) (#) (#) (#) (#) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) ($)
SVC
(Pen.,C)
l1, 0.5 348 45 277,542 6544 88.50 97.70 5.05 99.98 93.10 52.52 97.68 9.56 −10,548
RF
(Trees)
80 341 53 281,175 2911 86.61 98.98 10.48 99.98 92.79 55.23 98.96 18.70 −6353
LOG
(Pen.,C)
l1, 0.5 349 45 278,807 5278 88.60 98.14 6.20 99.98 93.37 53.09 98.13 11.58 −11,168
Ensemble 348 46 279,411 4675 88.36 98.35 6.92 99.98 93.36 53.45 98.34 12.84 −10,847
More sophisticated ensemble classifiers may take greater ad-
vantage of the balance between low fraud cost and consistent
performance. Avenues for further research may include refining
the ensemble optimization process or assigned specific mod-
els to detect fraud and non-fraud transactions. Currently, all
models seek to accomplish the same goal of preventing fraud
by categorizing all transactions correctly. If fraud systems are
trained to identify fraud or non-fraud transactions, then the en-
semble may specialize weights more effectively and holistically
improve.
Figure 10: Scatter plot of F1 Score against fraud cost to identify relationship
between performance indicators. The y − axis represents fraud cost in USD -
thousands.
8.5. F1 Score uncorrelated with fraud cost performance
While examining ensemble performance, it became clear that
the F1 Score did not depict any clear relationship with cost per-
formance. However, many researchers including [13] and [42]
cite the F1 Score as a commonly used evaluation metric with
imbalanced data problems. To garner a better perspective of
the relationship between the F1 Score to other metrics in this
study, a scatter plot mapping it to fraud cost for all algorithms
is shown in Figure 10. Since a higher F1 Score indicates bet-
ter predictive power, we expected to find a negative relationship
between F1 and fraud cost.
Instead, a slight positive relationship was found between F1
and fraud cost. Little trending could be found using a linear
model, and the r value of the function mapping the plot is 0.071.
At the same time, Figure 8 outlines how a single F1 score often
corresponds a wide range of costs. This is likely explained by
the disproportionate weighting of T PR over PPV. True positive
rate considers how often fraud transactions are classified cor-
rectly and is calculated with T P and FN, the two most heavily
weighted detection outputs. Since F1 combines both T PR and
PPV, a low T PR and high PPV can generate the same F1 as a
high T PR and a low PPV .
Why, then, include PPV in FDS evaluation at all? Without
PPV , a model ceases to consider the occurrence of false posi-
tives (false alarms). In this study, FP was weighted extremely
low, as it only represents the cost of addressing a false alarm.
However, it may cost a great deal more through its intangible
effects on business operations. For example, a credit card user
who consistently has their transactions blocked unnecessarily
will likely stop using their card, losing companies revenue and
perhaps tarnishing its public image. From another perspective,
employees will be overwhelmed by false alarm transactions un-
til potentially fraudulent transactions can be verified automat-
ically. Thus, F1 necessarily considers T PR and PPV , but ap-
pears unable to appropriately weight their influence for credit
card fraud detection.
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Another valid question is how to proceed with evaluating
Fraud Detection Systems. It would be a mistake to propose
quantifying performance solely with cost-based algorithms.
The financial effects of fraud, particularly credit card fraud,
are difficult to quantify in general, let alone for specific firms.
An approximation-based cost matrix may add value to discern-
ing optimal FDS practices, but ultimately it should be supple-
mented by other metrics. As with ensemble predictions, evalu-
ation metrics are most effective when used in conjunction.
9. Discussion
The objectives of this analysis were to determine optimal ap-
proaches for addressing credit card fraud in online channels. As
technology evolves, innovate methods of payment will continue
to arise, potentially using blockchains or other systems. There-
fore, it is imperative to develop a structure for detecting fraudu-
lent purchases where little or no precedent exists and traditional
approaches like profiling purchasing behavior are unavailable.
For some like [10], the issue presents itself as a matter of
sampling. Overcoming data imbalance is one of the major
hurdles for efficiently preventing fraud. Therefore, we explic-
itly analyzed the benefits and drawbacks of undersampling and
SMOTE. While it appeared that SMOTE’s creation of synthetic
records ultimately caused over-fitting to the minority class, re-
searchers continue to add innovative adaptations [43]. Particu-
larly with credit card fraud, the composition of training data is
far more essential for success than size.
For others, credit card fraud detection is approached by find-
ing and tuning the most effective model. While dozens of Fraud
Detection Systems have been proposed and tested, few operate
under the resource constraints found in industry [1]. Therefore,
we implemented five machine learning algorithms that are not
reliant on computationally expensive procedures. The control
model, K-Nearest Neighbors, embodies all of the pitfalls a tra-
ditional machine learning model can suffer from when applied
to credit card fraud. Data imbalance tarnished KNN’s predic-
tive accuracy, even with re-balanced samples.
Fortunately, three models consistently generated low cost
metrics. All models were scored on a cost matrix that empha-
sized the societal cost of fraud by transaction as opposed to
generalizing a static cost for each fraud occurrence [29]. Logis-
tic regression proved to be the most efficient FDS and Random
Forest was the most consistent across different samples. Im-
plemented in another e-commerce fraud detection experiment,
Logistic Regression’s performance in [44] found similar pre-
dictive success to its results in this study. Moreover, SVC clas-
sification was the second most effect FDS, despite its lack of a
kernel function. Notably, it was able to do so in a fraction of
the time necessary to run a full Support Vector Machine.
Moreover, ensemble techniques and genetic algorithms are
applied to fraud detection, because of their versatility in broad
solution spaces and general ability to converge on an optimal
solution. Duman & Ozcelik (2011) [45] found relative success
detecting bank fraud with an ensemble of scatter search heuris-
tics and genetic algorithm optimization. However, they score
the performance of these algorithms solely on statistical met-
rics like AUROC, hit rate, and gini index. While these metrics
are particularly useful for cross-study comparisons, they pro-
vide little information to companies that wish to minimize cost.
In 1997, Stolfo et. al. [46] proclaimed that “a cost func-
tion that takes into account both the True and False Positive
rates should be used to compare ... classifiers.” Many studies
echo this sentiment, but some continue to publish innovative
Fraud Detection Systems without contextualizing cost benefits.
While the difficulty of quantifying the cost of fraud is a noted
and worthy criticism, it does not reduce the potential benefits
an approximated cost structure can provide as a supplemental
metric for existing methods. F1 scores were found to be un-
correlated with cost-based performance in this study. While it
is likely no one would score a fraud detection algorithm on F1
alone, the problems the metric suffers from are endemic to other
measures.
Criticism of AUROC is often borne from its inclusion of T N
rates that may hold FPR artificially low. Conversely, AUPRC
metrics are commended for eliminating some of the effects of
data imbalance by not considering T N. Yet, it is intuitively
clear that unnoticed fraud transactions (FN) are far more detri-
mental to a company than false alarms (FP). Yet, AUPRC, a
combination of these metrics, weights T PR and PPV equally.
Shouldn’t the area gained by improving T PR hold a greater sig-
nificance than area gained by PPV? We maintain it should.
With that said, the difficulty in discerning fraud cost man-
dates that it be supplemented by traditional metrics for several
reasons. Most importantly, standardized metrics unrelated to
cost allow for an unbiased categorization of Fraud Detection
Systems from an academic standpoint. Furthermore, just as
purchasing behavior changes over time, so do the costs of fraud
to a firm. Fraud cost matrices for companies have a shelf life,
and should only be used to supplement independent statistical
measurements. In this way, an algorithm can be characterized
independently and benchmarked against its peers, as well as
provide contextual information to firms that may wish to imple-
ment it. The problem of transferring Fraud Detection Systems
from academia to industry is continues today.
Few implementation practices are considered empirically
standard in the field of credit card fraud detection. Innovative
Fraud Detection Systems continue to be discovered at an accel-
erating rate. To ensure these innovations positively impact the
public, its performance must be clear to all parties involved. No
matter how creative, detection algorithms that rely on only cost-
based or statistical metrics [39] often do not provide enough
perspective to companies or researchers to quantify their im-
pact. Evaluating fraud models in a holistic manner facilitates
the adoption of Fraud Detection Systems worldwide, increas-
ing the probability that preventative technology outpaces the
proliferation of credit card fraud as spreads to new channels.
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